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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
29 MARCH 1982

# Foreign Lobbyists—the Way They Operate in Washington

With expert American advisers and millions to spend, nations from Australia to Zaire know how to get what they want from Uncle Sam.

Casting aside traditional diplomacy, one nation after another is plunging into American politics with multi-million-dollar lobbying campaigns aimed at swaying official U.S. policies.

Reaping the benefits of such spending—estimated at more than 100 million dollars annually—are scores of former high U.S. officials, including senators, House members and cabinet secretaries, whose political savvy and access to power are increasingly being sought by foreign governments and businesses.

Even relatively poor countries are spending heavily, often hosting lavish parties, grinding out press releases and underwriting junkets in an effort to impress American policymakers.

For many "hired guns" of foreign governments, the aim is simply to create good will for the country they represent. Increasingly, however, the goals are more specific: To win for their clients more U.S. aid, trade concessions, technical assistance or military hardware—or to block another country from obtaining such favors.

Among recent examples—

- President Reagan's proposed sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia, which Israel opposed, was snatched from apparent defeat in the Senate by an intense lobbying effort orchestrated by a Saudi prince and his U.S. advisers.

- The impoverished nation of Zaire paid the Washington-based law firm of Surrey & Morse \$208,524 over two years to plead its case for more foreign aid.

- DGA International, a specialist in representing foreign interests, was paid \$927,855 by Morocco to portray that country as a "stable influence" in Africa and to reverse a ban on the sale of arms to Morocco.

- Former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford and law partner Paul Warnke, former U.S. strategic-arms negotiating team, received \$200,000 to help the Australian

American market. They later helped resolve a dispute over the discovery of horse and kangaroo meat in a shipment of Australian beef to the U.S.

Justice Department records show 701 persons now registered as required under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, compared with 452 in 1970. However, no one is certain how many such agents are actually at work.

After studying the situation last year, the General Accounting Office found that registrations represent "only the tip of the iceberg" as a gauge of foreign-lobbying activity. Most agents, encouraged by lax enforcement of the law, do not comply, officials believe.


**Need for close watch.** The GAO report urged Congress to provide closer monitoring of all foreign agents, especially in light of the so-called Abscam cases, in which seven members of Congress were convicted of accepting illegal payments from persons they believed were Arab businessmen, but who, in fact, were disguised Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.

The expanding use of direct lobbying by foreign governments and industries is beginning to worry many lawmakers. "So much money is available that it's corrupting our governmental system," says Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.). "Foreign powers are able to hire very distinguished Americans with fine records to do their bidding—frequently when those interests are contrary to American interests."

DGA Vice President Lloyd Preslar



Senators and other guests at a lavish Saudi dinner.



An army of Japanese lobbyists is besieging Washington to fight for open trade.

disagrees. "Our Moroccan activity was more purely political than most of what we've done," he says. "Our firm thinks long and hard about what American interests are before we take on any client."

Adds DGA Chairman Charles E. Goodell, a former Republican senator from New York: "Most nations can't afford large embassy staffs. They are limited in resources and understanding of our legislative process. Our system is very different. Americans who know the nuances of the establishment can bridge the gulf."

Most Americans registered as foreign agents are attached to a relatively small number of large law or public-relations firms in Washington and New York. Such firms often have several foreign clients at a time. The Washington law office of Arnold & Porter is on file as foreign agent for 12 clients.

Foreign representation has become big business, with fees often topping a half-million dollars a year per client.

DGA, for example, has been paid a total of 1.8 million dollars by the Moroccan government since 1978. Former Senator Goodell reported 253 meetings, lunches and phone calls he made to State Department, congressional and other officials to promote arms sales to that country.

When noise problems threatened to keep the Concorde supersonic jet out of the U.S., its French manufacturer, Aérospatiale, turned to DGA for help in winning landing rights. The firm spent thousands of hours in preparing reports and testimony and contacting U.S. officials. For its successful effort, DGA received 1.9 million dollars over five years.

Included in the work performed

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
28 March 1982

# A war Salvador can't win?

By JOSEPH VOLZ

**W**ASHINGTON (News Bureau)—A young platoon leader in the El Salvador army, his troops pinned down by withering guerrilla fire, radioed for air support to strike back.

But his superior, the company commander, had a communications problem. He had no way to contact battalion headquarters—except by pay phone. So, armed with a pocketful of coins, the company commander marched to a phone booth, hoping he did not get a busy signal.

The officer got through, but there were more problems. Once higher headquarters phoned back to give the okay to the officer stationed at his pay phone outpost, the young platoon leader in the field had no way to contact the incoming plane. His men were lucky they weren't bombed by their own air force.

Is this any way to run a war? That's what the 40 United States military trainers in El Salvador are asking themselves. Their almost impossible mission is to improve military communications, teach the Salvadorans how to cut off enemy supply lines, maintain their weapons and launch an offensive.

President Reagan, Gen. David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other high officials in the U.S. government insist there are no plans to send American combat troops to El Salvador. Not only do the American people overwhelmingly oppose any military intervention, but Pentagon leaders say it would not work anyhow.

But it is becoming apparent that the little the U.S. is doing now militarily—either overtly or covertly—will not make much of a difference. Nor is it likely, regardless of who wins today's election, that the army will get stronger or guerrillas weaker.

Frank Snepp, the former CIA officer who wrote a controversial book criticizing CIA operations in Vietnam, said in an interview, "Maybe Gen. MacArthur was right during the Korean War—either you beat the bejesus out of the other side or you don't do it at all."

The Reagan administration is unlikely to withhold any financial aid to El Salvador. But it insists that it is not going to send in the troops either, or set up a naval blockade—which would be an act of war.

So what can the U.S. do to stop the well-entrenched guerrillas? Covert action by the CIA is one possibility.

There have been persistent reports of spending \$20 million to back a paramilitary team to harass Nicaragua, mainly by cutting off the guerrilla supplies being shipped to the 6,000 hard-core guerrillas in El Salvador. But keeping the "team"—and U.S.

**C** OTHER ACTIVITIES, conducted by the CIA and the top-secret National Security Agency, the huge worldwide organization of electronic eavesdroppers and wiretappers, are more likely.

Snepp thinks that the U.S. may have succeeded in tapping into the guerrilla command and control system and may be sending out phony messages to guerrilla commandos to confuse them.

He also anticipates that the U.S. may seek to use small, unmarked planes to attack air or ground efforts to supply the guerrillas. But Snepp doubts such operations will have much long-run effect.

Pentagon officials note that the guerrillas have been ingenious in figuring out ways to bring in supplies. Some examples of supply efforts:

- Arms are put on small boats in Nicaragua, unloaded at fishing villages in Honduras, then shipped on buses traveling major highways, right past sparsely patrolled borders into El Salvador.

- Helicopters are flying at low levels over water from Nicaragua into Honduras and from there arms are transhipped into El Salvador.

- The insurgents are using at least one barren island off the Salvadoran coast as a staging area. El Salvador has only a handful of patrol boats and a navy of a few hundred men to stop this activity.

Former CIA Director William Colby insists there is something the CIA can do with success. Writing in The Washington Post, Colby said "it is not necessary to turn to the covert approach" because many past clandestine operations are now conducted quite openly, activities such as supporting labor and agricultural organizations. He said foundations, funded by Congress, should be set up to support "centrist democratic elements" in Central America.

But some argue that U.S. financial support for democratic institutions alone—in the face of determined terrorist activities—is not enough.

Gen. Jones, who retires as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this summer, says it is "too hypothetical" even to discuss what U.S. military planners would suggest if the present course of action—\$81 million in military aid this year to prop up the 18,000-man army—does not work.

Some officials are puzzling, for example, about what Secretary of State Haig really meant when he talked about "going to the source" to attack the Salvadoran problem. The supplies come from the Soviet Union, through Cuba to Nicaragua, which also has military advisers from Cuba and other Communist bloc countries.

Some officials believe it is practical to mount another Bay of Pigs-style attack on Cuba—the

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23 MARCH 1982

## Why Not Aid Friends Openly?

In Central America's confused battlefield, the forces of democracy need all the help they can get from allies around the world. But for that aid to be effective it should be overt, and preferably multilateral, not a surreptitious black bag from the C.I.A. Better mechanisms to supply that help had best be devised quickly, while there are still democratic forces to receive it.

The case for such aid, in principle, is old and honorable. It was eloquently put by John Stuart Mill in 1859, in "A Few Words on Non-Intervention." Mill wrote:

"The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all governments. The despot must consent to be bound by it as well as the free states. Unless they do, the profession comes to this miserable issue — that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right."

In Central America today, Marxists make no secret whatever of their debts to Cuba. Social Democrats and Christian Democrats also get open and legitimate assistance from fraternal parties elsewhere. There is no reason to be defensive about overt United States assistance, preferably through founda-

tions, openly funded by Congress and with appointed but autonomous directors.

The argument for honesty is persuasively supported by the former Director of the C.I.A., William Colby, who knows better than most how much paranoia covert aid can create. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, once secret operations, send a stronger and no less credible signal now that both are openly funded through an international board. And labor and farm missionaries now get support through the aboveboard Asia Foundation.

Comparable foundations, says Mr. Colby, can make grants to Central American schools, publications, social and political organizations. And why, for that matter, cannot their boards include distinguished figures from the Caribbean? That could lessen the taint of unilateralism.

In tense situations where the United States is suspected of uglier designs, there is always a question whether recipients of aid can afford the association. But with or without justification, they are often already denounced as C.I.A. puppets. Offering open subsidy could hardly cause them more damage. There is no reason to keep the Americans' ideological preferences in the closet, like a shaming secret.

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
22 MARCH 1982

## Washington Whispers.

The White House is not unhappy at a leaked story of CIA plans to finance a multimillion-dollar anti-Communist force to halt shipments of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Officials at the CIA are hoping the story will add to pressure on Nicaragua to stop supplying the Salvadoran rebels.

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Some well-known names are showing up among supporters of a U.S.-Soviet freeze on nuclear weapons. Among them: Former CIA Director William Colby and Patti Reagan Davis, daughter of the President.

## ***Colby Backs U.S. Use Of Covert Operations***

WASHINGTON, March 18 (UPI) — William E. Colby, a former Director of Central Intelligence, said today that the United States was justified in using covert action to prevent another Cuban-supported government from spreading revolution to its neighbors.

"I don't think it is immoral, I think it is quite a proper thing," said Mr. Colby.

Speaking on the ABC-TV program "Good Morning America," Mr. Colby said the situation in Nicaragua was analagous to that in Angola.

"The point is," he said, "do we want to look forward to a Nicaragua like Angola today and then to see the revolution spread to the neighboring area?"

He added: "The Government of Angola, which Congress prohibited us from acting in, is now a Government upheld by some 15,000 or 20,000 Cubans. Now is that what we're looking forward to in Nicaragua?"

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18 March 1982

# COVERT ACTION

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- FORMER CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLBY -- LIKENING THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA TO THAT OF ANGOLA SEVEN YEARS AGO -- SAID TODAY THE USE OF COVERT ACTION IS JUSTIFIED TO DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE LEFTIST SANDINISTA REGIME.

"I THINK THE POINT IS DO WE WANT TO LOOK FORWARD TO A NICARAGUA LIKE ANGOLA TODAY," SAID COLBY, "AND THEN TO SEE THE REVOLUTION SPREAD TO THE NEIGHBORING AREA."

"THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA, WHICH CONGRESS PROHIBITED US FROM ACTING IN, IS NOW A GOVERNMENT UPHELD BY SOME 15,000 OR 20,000 CUBANS. NOW IS THAT WE'RE LOOKING FORWARD TO IN NICARAGUA?" COLBY ASKED DURING AN INTERVIEW ON ABC'S "GOOD MORNING AMERICA."

BUT, REP. GERRY STUDDS, D-MASS., APPEARING WITH COLBY, SAID THE HISTORY OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA HAS BEEN ONE OF "TRAGIC ARROGANCE."

STUDDS SAID THE USE OF COVERT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MANAGUA REGIME IS "IMMORAL, ILLEGAL AND THEY DON'T WORK."

"I DON'T THINK IT IS IMMORAL, I THINK IT IS QUITE A PROPER THING," SAID COLBY, CIA DIRECTOR DURING THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS.

"THE WHOLE POINT OF HAVING A COVERT ACTION IS OF HELPING FRIENDS. IT DIFFERS FROM INTERVENTION," SAID COLBY. "THE WHOLE POINT IS TO USE COVERT ACTION SO THAT YOU WON'T HAVE TO USE MILITARY FORCE."

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# Central America: Can We Shore Up the Center?

*William E. Colby*

## Political Action —In the Open

In the cries of El Salvador's parallel to Vietnam, emotion overpowers rationality. A passive electronic-listening warship in international waters is equated to the Tonkin Gulf incident. M16 rifles in the hands of three American advisers are equated to the landing of the Marine combat forces in 1965. The problems of any guerrilla conflict are equated to the final defeat of South Vietnam at the hands of North Vietnamese artillery and armor. Perhaps we will also be presented with a desperate assault on the American Embassy in San Salvador for its media impact on American will—whatever its failure in practical terms.

Most disturbing is the view of the great American nation frightened of the prospect of military action, even in a dispute so close to its interests. What doubts must assail allies dependent on our treaty obligations of collective security as they observe this quivering panic produced by a few guerrillas in a neighboring country?

Yet there is some basis for the reaction. The frustration of the American military effort in Vietnam showed that something was wrong. The ponderous American military machine does not seem applicable to subversive war through proxies. The overthrow of the shah of Iran raises questions about the stability of an authoritarian force against revolutionary passion, whatever the economic and social improvements it may be making.

President Reagan's proposal for the Caribbean Basin and Central America properly allocates \$5 for economic and social programs for every \$1 spent on security assistance. This recognizes the deep-seated basis for revolt within Central America's oligarchic societies, grinding poverty and historically well-founded suspicion of the Yankee role. Only by such longer-term, positive economic and social programs can a change be made in these fundamentals on which revolutions are so easily founded.

In the meantime, security assistance is also essential to those nations struggling for their existence and the hope of a more democratic future. Not only are the revolutionary forces clear in their virulent hatred of the United States, but the examples of Iran, Vietnam and Cuba and, increasingly, Nicaragua also demonstrate that their authoritarianism will be more intense and brutal than what they propose to replace. A short-term security contribution to prevent an easy success of the proxy-Soviet and Cuban adventure is well warranted.

But another dimension of strategy is glaringly absent: the political. The administration looks to elections to provide legitimacy in the nations of Central America, as though this will automatically produce popular allegiance. This is a nice theory, but it is obviously inadequate. It assumes that, if the revolutionary forces were to join the elections and win them, the outcome would be quite satisfactory. It also ignores the prospect that the most oligarchic and brutal forces may win elections, even free ones. The first outcome gives power to those hostile to the United States. The second ensures repudiation by American public opinion.

The United States must have a better choice than a brutal dictator or a hostile terrorist. The missing dimension must be vigorous support of decent, responsible centrist leadership and political forces in these countries.

In the 1950s and '60s, this duty would have been quietly assigned to the CIA. In Western Europe, it was remarkably successful in supporting centrist forces against communist subversive campaigns. But after the orgy of recrimination against our intelligence agencies in the mid 1970s, it is clear that assigning this mission to the CIA would be quickly revealed and denounced.

It is not necessary to turn to the covert approach. Many of the programs which in the 1950s were conducted as covert operations now are conducted quite openly and consequently without controversy. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have been turned over to the Board of International Broadcasting. The Asia Foundation and projects to build labor and agricultural organizations are now supported out of official AID and similar funds.

One or more foundations or similar organiza-

tions should be openly established to assist the development of centrist democratic elements in Central America. They should be autonomously managed by appointed boards and funded by Congress. Schools, publications, activist organizations, congresses and the like should be generated and assisted, to enlist supports in the effort to produce a better society under local leaders. Such foundations should welcome the support of political groups and forces from elsewhere in Latin America.

These foundations would of course have to obtain approval from local governments for their activities, and to act in the open. But official American support could be expressed by sympathetic ambassadors in strong terms. This would undoubtedly arouse protests from communist and proxy groups throughout the world. These should be given the same consideration that we give to the distinction they pretend between the activities of the Soviet government and those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its international fronts.

This political factor would give cohesion to the economic, social and security elements of our strategy in Central America. Rather than waiting hopefully for political results to come from economic and social programs, it would mobilize the population to achieve them. Rather than pretending neutrality among the potential winners of free elections, it would link the United States with dynamic and healthy leadership. And it would have no historical reference point in Vietnam.

*The writer, a former director of Central Intelligence, is a Washington lawyer.*

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES  
11 MARCH 1982

## 139 Legislators Urge Nuclear Arms Freeze By U.S. and Moscow

By JUDITH MILLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 10 — Seventeen senators and 122 members of the House of Representatives joined today in sponsoring a resolution calling for a freeze in the levels of Soviet and American atomic arsenals.

The nonbinding measure, which was introduced in both houses, was immediately criticized by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. in testimony before a Senate subcommittee. He said the proposed freeze would have a "devastating" effect since it would perpetuate as much as a "6 to 1" Soviet advantage in nuclear weapons in Europe.

### 'Mutual and Verifiable' Cuts

Proponents, among them Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of the Bronx, held a news conference at American University's Kay Chapel to announce the introduction of the single-page measure, which urges the United States and Soviet Union to "pursue a complete halt to the nuclear weapons race."

It calls upon the superpowers "to decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze" on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear arms, and then to pursue "mutual and verifiable" reductions in weapons stockpiles.

Of the measure's 17 sponsors in the 100-member Senate, 13 are Democrats, among them Daniel Patrick Moynihan

of New York and Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut; the four Republican Senate sponsors include Lowell P. Weicker Jr. of Connecticut. Of the 122 sponsors in the 435-member House, 105 are Democrats and 17 Republicans.

Mr. Haig, who appeared before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, maintained that the proposal would adversely affect the Soviet-American talks in Geneva aimed at limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

"This is not only bad defense policy, but it is a bad arms control policy as well," Mr. Haig concluded.

Privately, Administration officials expressed concern that the growing movement against nuclear weapons was increasing pressure on President Reagan to begin talks with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting strategic nuclear forces.

The freeze initiative has been endorsed by a long list of prominent business, religious, intellectual and political figures, including George F. Kennan, the Soviet expert and diplomat; William E. Colby, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Thomas J. Watson Jr., former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union and former chairman of I.B.M.

Among those speaking at the news conference on behalf of the resolution were religious leaders, many of whom have played key roles in organizing grass-roots freeze initiatives.

Freeze resolutions, it was noted at the news conference, have been approved by legislators in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oregon, Wisconsin, Kansas and New York.

Last week, 159 of 160 town meetings in Vermont endorsed freeze proposals, and similar endorsements have been made by town meetings and city and country councils in South Dakota, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New Hampshire, Maine and Missouri. More than a million people have signed freeze-related petitions similar to the resolutions that were introduced in Congress today.

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, predicted that the nuclear arms race would become the "central moral issue of our day."

"What the Vietnam War represented to the 1960's," Mr. Schindler said, "the nuclear arms race will be to the 1980's."

Bishop James Armstrong, president of the National Council of Churches, said it was "obscene" for the Pentagon to have decided to name a new nuclear submarine the Corpus Christi.

"The name means 'body of Christ,'" Mr. Armstrong remarked. "Jesus Christ stands in direct opposition to everything nuclear weapons represent."



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
11 March 1982

## Covert action in Nicaragua?

As Washington's new evidence of Nicaraguan military buildup is being evaluated, prudence must be exercised to protect surrounding countries from any Nicaraguan military threat. The United States's hemispheric dominance gives it a key role in keeping the peace. Yet this role can be undercut by reinforcing the image of interfering bully rather than wise leader. Having drawn attention to the potential problem, the US can address it more effectively with the advice and cooperation of other members of the Organization of American States. Notable candidates in this instance might be such sturdy democracies as Mexico and Venezuela. They can help Washington see itself as others see it, and join to prevent armed encroachments in the region.

Thus when the existence of a danger is agreed upon it can be met with the open means characteristic of democratic societies, not the covert acts which are again in the news.

The gathering of intelligence is not the issue here. This is essential to any country's national security. Knowledge can help to preserve the peace. It can shape constructive policies; even as lack of knowledge, witness US intelligence failures in Iran, can cause problems.

In all the controversy over arms buildup in Nicaragua the most careful intelligence is important. The Reagan administration has recognized the need for establishing credibility by going public with some of the evidence behind its buildup allegations. If this is persuasive to other nations in the region they could be expected to share US concerns and support US initiatives.

Yet, according to recent reports, the CIA is going beyond intelligence gathering and proposing plans for covert actions against Nicaragua. This week the Washington Post cited administration officials as saying that President Reagan had authorized a plan to start forming a commando force of up to 500 Latin

Americans for paramilitary operations across the Honduras-Nicaragua border.

The reported initial budget of \$19 million was described by some as not very much. But part of the controversy over US covert action in Angola involved a mere \$1.3 million for recruiting mercenaries. Congress prohibited US intervention there in the mid-1970s.

The amount is not so crucial as whether the US should be going in the direction of more covert activities after all the ethical questioning of them — and all their counterproductive effects — as brought out during the various investigations of the intelligence agencies in recent years. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, for example, found that, of five paramilitary activities it studied, only one appeared to have achieved its objectives. Cyrus Vance

told the committee that covert actions should be undertaken "only when absolutely essential to the national security." The committee concluded: "The cumulative effect of covert actions has been increasingly costly to America's interests and reputation. The committee believes covert action must be employed only in the most extraordinary circumstances."

Have such circumstances arrived in Central America? It is a serious question for Congress and the public to answer. Congressional oversight committees cannot countermand a presidentially authorized covert action. But, as former CIA director William Colby has pointed out, there is usually time during the implementation for them to make any doubts known to the White House so that it can call off an operation if it decides to do so.

In other words, if there is a Nicaragua plan, it need not be carried out. Under a Reagan executive order, the authorizing of covert actions is less restrictive than during the previous administration. The challenge is to exercise the greatest responsibility and accountability to ensure that the problems found by the congressional investigations are not repeated.

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10 MARCH 1982

## WASHINGTON TALK

## Briefing

## Anti-Nuclear Effort

A bipartisan Congressional push for a freeze on nuclear war preparations by the United States and the Soviet Union will get under way this morning, appropriately enough, on the campus of American University. It was there in 1963 that a speech by President Kennedy set in motion final negotiations for the partial nuclear test-ban treaty signed later that year.

Heading the campaign will be Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Mark O. Hatfield, Republican of Oregon. Their resolution calls for both nations to halt the testing, production and further deployment of missiles, nuclear warheads and other delivery systems, and urges negotiations aimed at major reductions in current nuclear weaponry.

Attending the campus news conference, which may take on the dimensions of a political rally, will be W. Averell Harriman, who negotiated the test-ban treaty; William Colby, a former Director of Central Intelligence; representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the National Council of Churches and the leading House co-sponsors, Representatives Edward J. Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts; Sylvio O. Conte, Republican of Massachusetts, and Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of New York.

Francis X. Clines  
Warren Weaver Jr.

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# RADIO TV REPORTS, INC

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Braden and Phillips STATION WRC Radio

DATE March 10, 1982 5:20 AM CITY Washington, DC

SUBJECT William Colby/ Covert Operations Against Nicaragua

TOM BRADEN: Here we've got a story in the Washington Post this morning -- it's the only paper in the United States that carried this story -- and it says as follows: "President Reagan has authorized covert operations against the Central American nation of Nicaragua. According to informed officials, the President has begun to build and fund a paramilitary force of up to 500 Latin Americans, who are to operate out of commando camps spread along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border."

Now, Bill Colby, former Director of the CIA and an old-time war buddy of mine.

Bill, what do you think of that story?

WILLIAM COLBY: Well, I think it's outrageous that it's published. You know, we have a system for careful consideration of whether covert operations should be undertaken. The President has to look at them carefully. He has to be advised in writing by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and so forth. They have to then be reported to the two Congressional Committees on Intelligence to insure that the Congress thinks it's a good idea. And with that, you have to try to conduct a covert operation, under our constitutional system.

Now, if every one of these things comes out in the open -- and this wasn't the first one. We had last weekend in the New York Times the one about the Afghanistans and so forth -- and you just can't conduct covert operations...

BRADEN: Well, Bill, in the old days, when I was in the shop, it seems to me that the Director did not, at that time, have to report. He did always say -- he'd call the committee

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